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INTRODUCTION 
The Thesis 
For many years , political sys tems of  Communis t countries have 
been looked upon and regarded as party-dominated systems. In the 
case of  the People ' s  Republic of  China , it is generally believed that 
only the wish and policy of the Party (Chinese Communist Party) counts 
in the political system; all other organs of  state are merely tools 
to be used to pursue the poli�y of the Party and to implement i t .  In 
spite of this general recognition by students of Communist China's 
political system, this author is convinced that there is another 
organization which competes with the Chinese Communist Party for 
political domination . This organiza tion is the Chinese Armed Forces . 
Furthe rmore , the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (also called 
the cultural revolution) and its a fter math indicates that the mili­
tary has reduced the political domination of  the Party a great deal 
and has lifted itself above the Party in power politics . 
It is the author ' s  argument , as implied in the title o f  this 
thesis , that the military will continue to play an incresingly influen­
tial role in. the Chinese politic s .  Much of  its political domination has 
already been recognized and more will be recognized in the near future . 
1 
2 
The autl1or has chosen this period (1965 to the present) because 
this time span has revealed a great deal of political and ldcologlcal 
struggles between the military and the Party. But, es will be noticed, 
some pertinent political phenomena in the past, i.e., the Great Leap 
Forward which dated back to 1958 is also discussed in order to shed 
more light on the understanding .of the present political atmosphere. 
This study has the following broad purposes: (1) to clarify 
the relationship between the military and the Party, the two political 
rivals, which have been competing for the control of power in the 
Chinese political system; (2) to show that in fact the Party has· 
become an advocate of revisionism (communism, in communist countries, 
is the only legitimate base for one to lead and rule the people) ; (3) 
to indicate the domineering position of the military over the Party, 
and the emergence of the military as a super power within Chinese poli­
tics; and (4) to demonstrate that Mao's maxim: "The Party commands 
the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party" is 
not a valid maxim after all. In fact the real maxim is the correct 
communist ideology. ·Whosoever advocates or professes to advocate the 
correct line dominates the Chinese political system. 
Importance of the Study 
This study attempts to establish, or at least substantiate, 
the proposition that in communist countries .. a non-party (i.e., the 
military as in Communist China) can dominate the political s�stem. 
The communist political system does not necessarily mean party. 
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politics; there will always be a clash between the "reds" and the 
"experts" unless the strict rule of ideology is relaxed and material 
incentiveness is tolerated by the political system. 
Definitions of Terms Used 
China and Conununis t  China - -the People ' s  Republic of China; 
Military--all military es tablishments , es pecially the PI.A 
(People ' s  Liberation Army) ; 
Economism and revisionism--a separation of economics from 
politics and a primacy of economic and technologica l  
solutions over conununist ideology; and 
Party- -the Chinese Communis t  Party. 
PART I. PRELUDE TO MILITARY DOMINATION 
CHAPTER I 
THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD 
The Great Leap Forward phenomenon provides the essential 
element for a better understanding of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution. The Great Leap Forward was an attempt o f  Mao Tse-tung 
to concretize two Maoist concept s :  the supremacy of  the Communist 
ideology over experts and their expertize, and human labor over 
machinery . The impact of  the Great Leap Forward on Chinese society 
was eminent as revealed in the follQwing discussion. 
_In June , 1966,  the volcanic eruption of the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution in the People ' s  Republic o f  China created turmoil 
in Chinese society in general and Chinese political leadership in 
particular . Her internal politics were viewed with special attention 
by nations of the world. 
Mao Tse-tung, the cha irman o f  the Chinese Communist Party who 
hnd hccn Ln rctn•at for some time, reappeared in the 1 lmcl f.ght at lla· 
center of Chinese politics aga in. Mao ' s  reappearance and the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution led to wild speculat ion in the world 
as to what was going on in the People ' s  Republ ic of China and why 
there had to be a revolution. 
4 
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The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was des igned by Mao 
to achieve a totally revolutionized form of Chinese culture . This 
culture included , " ideology , social though t ,  world outlook , customs 
and habits, political points of view as expressed through art , .films , 
theat re ,  dance , fine arts , education, literature and other departments 
which compose the superstructure o f  society . 111 Thus , this revolµtion 
was a complete overhaul of Chinese life and society. 
Origin of the Great Prqletarian Cultural Revolution can be 
traced back and understood more clearly when looking at the Great 
Leap Forward and the " People ' s  Commune Movementn which spanned from 
1958 to 1960 under the leadership of Mao Tse -tung. 
Basically, the Great Leap Forward was a master plan designed 
to increase production of the country "on all economic fronts at an 
unprecedented high rate .112 The People ' s  Corra:nune Movement was designed 
to create th
.
roughout China an individual "self-sufficient organization" 
that combined all aspects of people ' s  l ives in one single commune -unit . 
. Within the commune -unit there would be a collective way of life ,  a 
division of labor, and the supers tructure that would fulfill the needs 
of the commune. In short, it was a state within a state . That is 
"the commune adopts a partial supply system providing members with a 
suitable amount of free supplies which, to a l imited extent, embodies 
1Gerald Tannenbaum, "China's Cultural Revolution: Why It Had 
to Happen , "  in Richard Buam and Louise B .  Bennett (eds .) , China in 
Ferment :  Perspectives On the Cultural Revolution ( Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Ha l l ,  Inc . · ,  1971) , p .  60 . 
2 
Kang Chao,  "Economic A ftermath o f  the Great Leap in Corranunist 
China , "  Asian Survey, No . 4 (May, 1964) , p .  851. 
6 
(ideologically) the principle of ' to each according to his needs' ' o.f · 
the Communist society .113 
In order to make the program a success , a great deal o f  capi-
tal investment and labor were needed . Capital investments involved 
big industries and machinery requiring expenditures which China lacked . 
The Communist leadership , therefore , used cheap and crude methods 
instead of modern technology. They created backyard industries. in 
place of a modern industrial system� The most famous of them a l l  .was 
the backyard-furnace system. These backyard furnaces were used to 
produce stee l .  But these backyard industries did not go anywhere 
and proved to be a fa ilure later . 
• I I 
The backyard industries also manif�sted a severe shortage· of 
capital and.lack of reserves in'Conununist China . There was not enough 
help from outside. Aid and assistance from the Soviet Union .had not 
been adequate enough. Furthermore, because of the disagreement between 
the two countries concerning China ' s  overemphasis on ideology and under-
emphasis on technical standards , the Soviet Union terminated aid, assist-
4 ance and experts to China in August of 1960 . The termination of  Soviet 
aid and assistance damaged Chif1;a ' s  economic progress gravely, "but the 
psychological lesson which the Soviets' draconian measures were meant 
3Yung Ping Chen, Chinese Political Thought : Mao Tse -tung and 
Liu Shao -chi (The Hague , Netherlpnds: Martinus Nijhof f ,  1971), p .  65 . 
4Jan S .  Prybyla , The Political Economy of Communist China 
(Pennsylvania : International Textbook Co . ,  1 970) , p. 318.  
7 
to convey to the Chinese romantics apparently did not sink l.n.115 It 
only proved to the Chinese that "the foreigner ,  fraternal or not, 
could not be trusted.116 
Thus the only thing the Communist leaders could do was to 
"substitute human labor for capital investment . "7 For examp l e ,  
I 
instead of building up steel industries, they substituted for it  
with backyard furnaces which forced people to use their strength and 
most of their tim� compensating for the lack of machinery . Further-
more , in other factories that were already functioning , Communist 
leade·rs " exerted tremendous pressure on local party members, direc.tors 
of conununes and managers of local enterpris�s to expand prod.uction at 
a pace practica lly imposs ible to achieve. 118 The followi�g description 
by Mende well illustrates the heavy mobil ization and uses o f  human 
beings in the Great Leap Forward period: 
The countryside was in convulsion. Marching in columns 
and working in dense crowds , inunense peasant masses were. 
spending their over-spilli�g energy . . .  Enormous crowds 
were carrying sand to swell embankments . along rivers . 
Marchers . . .  were . . .  on the·ir way to replace teams laying 
rail tracks . . .  , they recalled the rhythmic breathing of 
some mythological colossus , suddenly awakened and flexing 
its milliard muscles in a supreme effort to change the 
face of the earth. 9 
5rbid . ,  p .  317 . 
6
rbid . 
7George P .  Jan, "Mass Education in the Chinese Cominunes , "  
Asian Survey, No . (October, 1964) , p .  
8Ta -Chung Liu, "Economic Development of the Chinese Mainfand , 
1949-196 5 , " · in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds .) , China in Crisis , Vol . 
I ,  Book 2 (University of Chicago Press , 1968) , p .  631 . 
9Tibor Mende , China and Her Shadow (New York: Coward-McCan, 
1962) , p .  70 . 
8 
Unfortuna tely for the Chinese ,  labor alone is not enough to 
indus trialize a country; indus trialization also requires money and 
material . But instead of giving money and material ,  Communist 
leadership gave the masses only inspirational slogans : "Give your 
hear to the Party1110 was to spiritually lift and encourage the ma sses 
to trust the Party and not to fear hard work; "Every rural township 
with its inventions, every cooperative with its improvements11l l  was 
aimed to tell the masses tha t ,  rightly or wrongly, "technological 
innova tion was to spring from the practical experience and the inven-
tive genius of the masses rather than from laboratories ,  acodcmics , 
1 2  universities and other centers of research and learning ."  
To make things more difficult , Mao ,  who was the henchman of 
the program, made very little use of experts and their specializations 
in all  fields . For instance , he sent economic experts to work in 
villages and factories and ordered them not to interfere with the 
way the regime was running things and keep their mouths tightly : shut . 13 
Moreover, Mao ' s  overemphasis on indigenous production methods was a 
costly mistake for it overlooked the necessity of the need for experts , 
I 
managerial · personnel and technicians in order to have well -run indus -
tries . As it turned out, the Great Leap Forward and the People ' s  
lOPrybyla , .2.E.· cit . ,  p .  258 . 
11 
Yang Min, " Revolution in Farm Tools , "  Peking Review (May 13,  
1958) , p .  10 . 
12 . .  Prybyla ,  .Q.E.• c it . ,  p .  269 . 
13 Kang Chao, .Q.E.· cit . ,  p .  857 . 
9 
Commune were catastr9phic failures caus ing famine and economic disaster 
in China .
14 
By the end of 1960 , the Great Leap Forward and the People ' s  
Commune were " . • •  for all practic.al  purposes dead--only the symbols and 
the s emantics remained. The radicals (Mao and his followers) were in 
retreat . . .  , disgruntled, bitte�, shifting position, and wa iting for 
the next opportunity to stage a comebac�.1115  Finally,  after six years 
of retreat, Mao and his followers did stage a comeback during the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution ..  
Economic Impact 
The Great Leap Forward h'ad a very profound impact .on Chinese 
society. It not only deeply affected the Chinese economy , but it also 
provided , for the first time, a rationale for the anti-Maoist faction 
to cha llenge Mao's authority and his political sta tus as wel l .  The 
Great Leap Forward will demonstrate that economic failure could very 
well lead to a change in polit ical power, even in a total itarian 
country l ike Corrmunist China. 
Kang Chao describes the economy of the Great Leap Forward : 
China • • •  had been afflicted by a prolonged and serious 
agrarian cr1s1s . The economic situation made continued 
industrial expansion impossibl e .  The most obvious con­
sequence of the Great Leap was the enormous waste involved . 
Indigenous production methods often proved either too costly 
in comparison with their counterparts in the modern sector 
or capable of producing only low quality goods . A large 
number of backyard furnaces hastily built in 1958 dissolved 
into piles of mud and brick after a few rains . . • .  
14Franz Michael ,  "The Struggle for Power,"  Problems of 
Corranunism, No. 3 (May-June , 1967) , p .  12. 
15Prybyla , .££.· cit. , p .  293. 
Another serious form of waste was created a s  a result 
of inter-industry imbalance. Because the Great Leap 
movement was improvised rather than well-planned in 
terms of inter-industry coordina tion, and because 
bottlenecks came sooner in some industries than in 
others as the movement proceeded, the economy was 
completely off-ba lance . .  · . .  Stocks piled up in those 
industries which had overproduced, while production 
capacities could not be ful;Y utilized in other fields 
due to material shortages .  
10 
Thus, one can see tha t economic policy such as the Great Leap 
Forward, as Professor Prybyla has pointed out , 
. . .  is for those who like excitement, but the excite­
ment wears off and apathy sets in . It is fairly 
obvious, yet it can stand repetition that one .cannot 
ask for night and day toil from even the most ideologi­
cal fired up masses without a t  some point meeting the 
payroll .  The Great Leap did not meet the payroll ,  and 
the predictable result was the w idespread resentment 
and passive resis tance . : .. In sorile"instances passive· 17 resistance turned into open rebellion by the mas�es . 
Mao ' s  failure to carry the Great Leap Forward to the intended 
goal has not only damaged China ' s. economy as a whole ,  it has also dis -
couraged and disgusted the technicians and managerial personnel . 
. . .  Under the slogans "politics take command" and "rel iance 
on the mass l ine," the administrative system within the 
enterprise underwent considerable disruption. Technicians 
and engineers were humil iated by the existence of a situa­
t ion under which experts had to l isten to non-experts in 
technical matters, scientific laws were replaced by poli­
tical demands , and production fell into the hands of a 
group of "fanatics . 1118  
16Kang Chao, .Q.E.· cit . ,  pp . 853-54 . 
17Prybyla , .QP.• cit . ,  p .  333. 
18 Kang Chao, .Q.E.• .£!£ . ,  p .  858 . 
11 
This humiliation of the intellectuals ,·among others , created · 
the controversy of "Red" versus "Expert" which is one of the factors 
that contributes to military domination in China (see CHAPTER VII) . 
Political Impact 
The failure of the Great Leap Forward and Commune system was 
very harmful to Mao, who was the architect of the plans . The Chinese 
people began to doubt his judgment. •  He' was losing face and authority . 
Mao ' s  delicate position can be understood when we look a t  the 'l i_v�ng 
and working conditions of the Chinese peasantry (most of the Chinese 
are peasants) during the p�rio� �hen the Great Leap Forward and the 
Commune system were in full swing . Because of these plans , the people 
had to suffer extreme hardships . Elaborating on this point1 Club 
observe s :  
The utiliz ing of labor had brought truly onerous 
working conditions . In the past the Chinese peasants 
. . .  had enjoyed certain unengaged periods during the 
working years . . . •  Under the conditions of the Great 
Leap, however ,  the peasants were not even given 
enough time for sleep . There was . . .  a spread of 
illness • . .  
• . �peasants '(were forced to) eat in common mess halls , 
wher� they got both inadequate food and faulty service, 
. . .  ( and in order) to find metals to feed the furnaces , 
the peasant was forced to give up his kitchen utens ils ,  
the hinges of his doors , 1�nd any other bits and pieces (that could be found) . • •  
While the disaster of the Great Leap Forward was being realized, 
Mao ' s  opponents stepped forward and spoke out against Mao ' s  policy. 
One of the chief opponents was .Marshall P ' eng Teh-huai,  then the 
1 90 .  Edmund Club, 20th Centurv China,. (New York: Columbia 
University Pres s ,  1972) , p .  361 .· 
1 2  
Minister of National Defense ,  who openly attac�ed Mao ' s  policy � t  the 
famous Lushan meeting of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist 
Party (July-Augus t ,  1959). Peng opposed Mao ' s  Great Leap, the' People ' s  
Commune Movement,  and Mao ' s  emphasis on China ' s  self-sufficiency , free 
from outs ide help , especially �.r°'m Russia'. Instead Peng was an ·arch 
proponent of Russian assistance and advocated professionalism and· 
heavy reliance upon the advice of experts rather than Mao ' s  puritanic 
ideological approach . 
For " . . .  the first time in the history of the Chinese Communist 
movement s ince 1935 , Mao's personal leadership and programs had come 
under attack by a long time , trusted "comrade-in-arms" who , moreover., 
had managed .to muster support within the top leadership . 112° For this 
act,  Peng " . . .  has transformed himself from a mere henchman of Mao Tse-
tung into a spokesman of the Chinese peasants and a maker of Chinese 
. 21 history . "  
Liu Shao-chi, then vice-cha irman of the Chinese Communist 
Party and also vice-chairman of the People ' s  Republic of China , posi-
t ions second only to those of Mao ' s  dual chairmanship, was Peng ' s  
supporter though not overtly a t  the t ime . 
When Mao stepped down from the position of chief of s tate and 
governmental heirarchy by res igning from the chairmanship of the 
People ' s  Republic of China in December ,  1958 , it was understood that 
he did so because he had been asked by his opponents , and also because 
20Philip Bridgham, "Mao 1 s ' Cul tural Revolution ' :  Origin and 
Development , "  China Quarterly, No . 29 (January-March , 1967) , p .  2 .  
21Kung Chu , an introduction in The Case of P ' eng Teh-huai 1959-
1968 (Hongkong: Union Research Rureau , 1968) , p .  i i i .  
13 
the political s ituation compelled him to do so . 22 In April , 1 95 9 ,  
Liu Shao-chi, a prime target of the Red Guard ' s  attack in the Great 
Proletarian Cul tura l Revolution, was named cha irman of the People ' s · 
Republic of China . 
Liu, '' . .. a reluctant dragon, who never directly attacked Mao ' s  
prestige or cla im to leadership, but, . . .  led the .retreat from Mao ' s  
extreme programs through a series of practical measures . . .  1123  For 
instance, in January, 1961 , Liu issued a "12-point emergency directive 
regarding rural work , "  which restored the peasants ' right to cultivate 
private plots and to sell their produce in ' free ' marke ts , and which 
stipulated that labor should be given more rest than they had been 
al lowed under the frenz ied mob ilizat ion of the Great Leap Forward . 11 24 
I 
Concurrently, the Central Committee of the Communist Party which 
formerly supported Mao ' s  policy, this time endorsed a so-called "8-
character charter" designed to correct the economy of the G·reat Leap 
25 
Forward .  
Liu Shao-chi was a pramatis t ,  not a domatis t .  He knew the 
usefulness of experts and specialists in industrialization. Therefore , 
26 
he re-established practical procedures in industry . In other words , 
l ike Peng, he accentuated scientific practices and enterprise in indus -
tria l ization over ideological preference . 
22Michael; .Q.E.· £.i!:.., p . .is. 
23Ibid . ,  p .  1 6 .  
24Ibid . ,  p .  17  (an interyiew with Ting Wang by Franz Michael) . 
25Peking Review, January 27 , 1961 , pp . 3-5 . 
26Michae l ,  .Q.E.• cit . ,  p: 17 . 
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To M�o ,  the dismantl ing of his programs .was much more than a 
disagreement in policy or opinion . It was like being slapped in the 
face . His feel ings were badly hurt . In addition, his ultimate ambi-
t ion as  a theoretician " . . .  to claim the supreme leadership o f  the 
27 Marxist -Leninist world movement • . .  " was destroyed because his 
communization of the Great Leap had failed. Therefore , Mao always 
looked at Liu Shao-chi and Peng Teh-huai and their supp�rters in the 
Party (not his impractic.al plans) as "persons" who failed him. 
As suggested above , Mao ' s  political power and leadership were 
not as  firm as they used to be . He had been attacked and his oppos i-
tion cont inued to grow steadily, though s ilently. Thus the political 
impact of the Great Leap Forward was a downgrading of Mao ' s  authority 
in Chinese politics . Polit ically, his control over power pplit ics 
proved to be sl ipping away, but it was not completely out of his hand . 
Ideologically, his Maoism also confirmed, as we have seen in the Great 
Leap policy, that ideology alone ' cannot substitute for the technical 
know-how and intelligent advice of experts in the fields of economics 
and engineering. 
27
Ibid . 
CHAPTER II 
THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLtrrION 
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution was a successor to 
the Great Leap Forward . It was to complete what the Great Leap had 
started and failed, that is , an emphasis on the supremacy of ideology 
and human beings . Furthermore, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revo-
lution was also a significant factor for political change in Chinese 
politics . It provided a way for the military to intervene in politics , 
. 
which later led to political domination of the military. In order to 
understand the origin, consequences , and purposes of the Great Prole-
tarian Cultural Revolution, the following ideological principles and 
political facts should be unders tood . 
RcvisioniRm vcrsuR Mno iRm 
The failure of the Great Leap Forward and People ' s  Commune 
movement,  in part returned China to a policy of economism. The term 
"economism" means a separation of economics from politics , and a pri-
macy of econom ic solutions over communist ideology and moral values . 
This principle of economism was strongly advocated by Liu Shao-�hi 
and his fol lowers in the Party. 
Later on , the progress of indus trializat ion and modernization 
helped push China into an even deeper stage of economism, as evidenced 
15 
16 
by the strong conunitmen t to economic developmen t rather than ideologi-
cal commitment . In Commun ist Chin a ,  Professor Schram observes : 
. . .  the process of indus trializat ion and modern ization 
. . .  led to the emergence of the same tendencies which 
have been engendered by economic development in other 
countries: increasing functional differen tiation and 
the birth of new forms of social stratification , the 
subordination of moral values to t2§hnical rational ity, 
the primacy of economic incen tive . 
To Mao, this is "revis io.n ism , "  or a step of taking the road 
back to cap�talism. He was very mu�h dissatisfied with these pre-
vailing tendencies,  and he surely had reason to be so. " . . .  (T)he 
domina tion of a bureaucratic and technocratic elite in the Soviet 
Un ion appeared to him to be Linked to the developmen t of such 
' capital is t '  tendencies . . .  11
29 
A practice of revisionism is one of the most dangerous things 
one can do to commun ism, for it encourages people to look for materia l -
istic incentives and private gai'.ns rather than ideological. conunitmen t 
and public interest .  To Mao, therefore , revisionism was· intolerable 
and must be destroyed. He , in the cultura l revolution , a t· least in 
pa rt,  subdued its gr� th . 
Mao ' s  Dis trust of the Party and Its Leadership 
When Mao stepped down from the Presidency iri 1958 , he was 
al ready being treated increasingly as irrelevant for the day-to-day 
28stuart R. Schram, "The Party in Chinese Commun ist Ideology ,"  
China Quarterly, No . 38 (April-Jun e ,  1969) , p .  2 6 .  
29Ibid.  
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operations of government .  As the Red Guards declared later·, Cha irman 
Mao resented the fact that Liu Shao-chi, who succeeded him as Presi-
dent of the Republ i c ,  began to treat Mao as  "··.�one treats a paren t 
a t  his funeral . . •  " - -that is , revering him but not asking his ad.vice . 30 
It was also apparent to Mao' that Liu and his supporters were 
drifting away from Maoism, which strongly advocated ideological .com-
mitment . Mao ' s  deep dissatisfact ion with the bourgeois and bureaucra -
tic tendencies of the policies 1 w�s obvious . He wanted to correct this 
situation. In the past ,  he had always relied upon the Party to fight 
back these tendenc ies, but this time he could not do so because the 
Party and its leadership led by Liu Shao-chi were, according to Mao, 
renegades who themselves degenerated toward revis ionism. 31 
Revolut ionary Zeal 
In addition to his distrust of the Party and its leadership, 
Mao was also concerned about the lack of revolutionary experiences of 
the Chinese youth . These included enduring hardship, and developing 
both a fighting spirit and strong will power which only revolution can 
provide .  In this sense Mao applied his experience as well as experi-
ences of others who were his contemporaries . His generation had 
experienced hardship, had l ived for the revolution, had fought for it, 
and mony hod <lied for it . 
30Lucian W .  Pye , The Spirit of Chinese Politics (Massachusetts: 
M.I.T. Pres s ,  1968) , p .  199 . 
31c. T. Frederick, "Leadership Purges in Corranunist China , "  
China Quarterly, No.  41 (January-March, 1970) , p .  122 . 
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To Mao ' s  generat ion , commun ist revolution created w ill . power 
and strength, and to him those thirtgs cannot be obtained outside the 
realm of revolution . It  meant that people must phys ically and psycho-
logically experience and l ive in a revolution. Mao once pointed out 
to the late Edgar Snow , well -kpw�n Sinologist and a personal friend 
of Mao,  that " . . .  those in China now under the age of twenty have·never 
fought the war and never seen an imperialist or knwon capitalism in 
power . 11 32 In saying that, Mao implied that his generation had suffered 
under the imperialism of the United States , Germany, Japan, etc., and 
the bourgeoise politics of Chiang Kai-shek in the period immediately 
before and right after World War II . This suffering made his generation 
wel l -motivated to fight for the Communist cause. In the same statement 
he ind icated that the now -youth are too soft , 33 and are not motivated 
enough for the Commun ist cause . Therefore , they might not be able to 
carry �ut " . . .  the world view that created the revolut ion . 1134 To Mao,  
the Corrnnunist revolution is a worldwide phenomenon and mus t be carried 
out not only in China but also abroad . This interpre tation is man i -
fested by the fact that Corrnnunist China is now supporting ,  financin g ,  
and arming Commun ist insurgencies throughout ,  t o  say the least, South-
east Asia . For example,  
. .. A Chinese labor force of several thousand ,  possibly 
including PLA soldiers in civilian clothes , has been 
engaged in . . .  strategic road-building program ( in Laos, 
w i thout the consent of the government of Laos) . . . .  The 
32Robert J .  Lifton, The Revolutionary Immortality' (New York: 
V intage Books , 1968) , p. 1 9 .  
33
Ibid. 
34 
Ibid . 
road-build ing crews are guarded by at  least two 
Chinese army battalions, including mobile anti­
aircraft batteries . 35 
. . .  The Chinese consulate . . .  is bel ieved to act as a 
contact point between th� Pathet Lao and Peking . 36 
1 9  
Thus, Mao felt tha t in order t o  have experience and revolution-
ary spirit, the young must l ive in the old society. But the old society 
I 
is now long gone . Then what can he do about getting the young to l ive 
in 'that society? To turn the clock back is imposs ible, which Mao 
recognized very wel l .  To g ive up the idea was also impos s ible for him. 
Therefore, a theoretician l ike him must find the solution for the prob-
lem. 
Finally, he found the solution . He made the young bel ieve that 
the P�rty leadership led by Liu Shao-chi was a revisionii t with a capi-
talistic element, and he transformed the young into the "Red Guard". and 
let them make a revolution--the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution--
for themselves to experience . 
The Struggle for Power 
Mao ' s  political control over Chinese politics was collective 
and not absolute, al though he may be the first among equals . He had 
lost some of his political control to Liu Shao-chi during and after 
the Great Leap Forward period; Mao wanted to have absolute control 
Ruler 
3SM t' ar in 
(New York: 
36
.'U?.!4· 
Ebon, Lin P iao: The Life and Writings of China ' s  New 
Stein and Day, 1970), p .  136 . 
20 
over · political a ffairs . · Therefore , it can be stated that the Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolut. ion was , among other things , also a 
struggle for powe r .  This was a struggle by which Mao Tse -tung., who 
cla imed to represent the proletarian class and ideology, wanted.- to, 
seize total power from his poli�ical opponents who advocated revi-
s ionism within the Party. 37 
. 
It was Mao who went all  the way to 
seize power even when it meant the destnict ion p f  the party. which 
he pa infully helped create and it was the party in the past that had 
been a foundation of his political power .
38 
37 
Philip Bridgham, "Ma o ' s  Cultural Revolution in 1969: The 
Struggle to Seize Power , "  China Quarterly, N o .  34 (April -June , 1968) , 
pp . 6 -37 . 
38K ikuro Ito and Minoru Shibata , "The Dilemma of Mao Tse.-·tung," 
China Quarterly, No.  35 (July-September, 1968) , p .  58 . 
CHAPTER III 
. 
MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION 
Revolut ion and Reaction 
In Mao ' s  thought, the increas ing of his power , the revita l i -
zation o f  the zeal of revolution and the destruct ion of revis ionism 
could be a chieved only by eliminating his opposition, led by Liu Shao-
chi in the party heirarchy, and by producing a totally new power struc-
39 
tur e .  The only means open to him was to use the masses as instruments 
to discredit and destroy his opponents . Mao, for political expediency 
as  well as political necessity, used fear and disruption as his weapons . 
He made. people suspect the motives of the Party heirarchy and be uncer-
tain about the political situation. He created turmoil in the nation 
which eventually created anar chy in China . 
This tactic of Mao ' s  is known as "positive anarchism." It is 
to appeal to the mass es ,  make them aware that his opponents were 
wrong and the Party under their dir�ction was taking the road back to 
capitalism, which is a deadly sin in Communism. Mao was very sure 
that in time of trouble the masses under tliis uncertain situation, 
particularly the young, would come to him. He was right, for his 
39K ikuro Ito and Minoru Shibata , "The DilellUlla of Mao Tse-tung," 
China Quarterly, No . 35 (July-September , 1968) , p .  58 . 
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charisma worked exceptionally well with the masses . He had become a 
ma
.
ster in manipulating them according to his wishes . Thus anarchical 
condit ions were created by Mao for this purpose . 40 
Mao ' s  masses , especially the Red Guards who were high s chool 
I 
and college students , in their frenz ied drive to seize power rampaged 
through the nation, disrupting politica l ,  social, and economic order. 
They destroyed everything they thought was bourgeois in nature . For 
example,  Christian churches were closed and destroyed, biblical pic­
tures were mutilated,41 the Red Guards took over the Roman Catholic. 
42 4 convents in Peking, and invaded Peking ' s  largest Islamic mosque . 3 
They a lso destroyed and burned art objects dragged out of Peking 
Central Art Academy .44 
In the daily work l ife of the Chinese,  Red Guards intervened 
and interfered in many factories and rice fields . They told experts 
in the factories that they had to run the factories according to Mao ' s  
though t .  Many factories were taken over by the Red Guards and workers 
in factories were prevented from doing their work. Peasants were forced 
to s tudy the little Red Book, and were beaten up if they refused to do 
s o .  As a reaction to the Red Guard$ activities , workers. and peasants , 
in order to be able to do their jobs , finally fought the Red Guar9s in 
40Ch . en , .Q.E. • .£.!.!.. , 
4�ew York Time s ,  
42New York Times , 
43Ibid. 
P · 1 3 .  
August 23,  1 96 6 .  
August 25 , 1966 . 
4�ew York Times, August 26,  196 6 .  
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many areas .4� "Serious , large-scale clashes were soon reported· not 
only in the provinces but in Peking as well .1146 
Red Guards were more than successful in creating turmo il in 
Chinese society. This anarchy was far more than anyone expected it 
would be,  perhaps even Mao himsel f ,  because the Red Guards not only 
discredited and undermined the existing power structure ,  they often 
murdered their opponents , burned down buildings and fac.tories indis­
criminately, which des troyed not only their opponents but also seri­
ously damaged the country' s  economy . The Chinese people suffered a 
great deal from the Red Guards ' activ ities . 
The Military as a Peace Promoter 
This anarchy eventually hurt Mao's image in the eyes of the 
public" Therefore , Mao called upon the Red Guards to stop interfering 
with the people ' s  work and stop destroying things indiscrimina tely . 
But the Red Guards were out of control by then and they cont inued their 
activ ities , regardless of Mao ' s  pleas. This s ituation was made worse 
when f ighting broke out a l l  over the country . Mao,  in order to stop 
this upheaval , had to turn to the military and his comrade-in-arms , 
Marshal l  Lin Piao who was then the Defense Minister. Lin Piao later 
became Mao ' s  heir-apparent until his mysterious death in 1 97 1 .  Mao ' s  
call for the military ' s  �elp permitted the intervention of the military 
which in turn provided a key for the military to unlock the door to 
political power in Communist China . 
45New York Times , December 9 ,  196 6 .  
46Bridgham, 22.· £!.t . ,  p .
· 
28 . 
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The disruption of the country by the Red Guards added more 
hardship to the l ivel ihood of the Chinese people . People were con­
fused and uncertain of what was going on . Therefore , when the mili­
tary was called in to put a stop to this commotion, it was welcomed 
and appreciated by the publ ic ; law and order was establis�ed by the 
military . To the Chinese people the military was a "hero on a white 
horse" who just performed a noble act for society. This noble act 
gave the military the reputatipn of a peace promoter and enhanced 
the military ' s  position. 
PART I I .  MILITARY DOMINATION 
CHAPTER IV 
MILITARY PROPAGANDA AND INDOCTRINATION 
Political propaganda and indoctrination have been used as 
effective weapons , especia lly in totalitarian regime s ,  to maintain 
the existing political values and behavior or inject new ones that 
would satisfy the purposes of th'e rulers . As a matter of strategy, 
. 
new myths are created for the justification of changes and scape-
goats are found for the past failures . For example, when Hitler 
needed support from the German people for his war plans , he created 
scapegoats , encouraged the publ�c and the army by putting the blame 
on other elements as having caused Germany ' s  defeat in World War I. 
As Brown observes : 
. . .  he (Hitler) reassured the nation that the War had 
not been lost by the army but by a stab in the bac.k 
from Jews and Communists thus g iving back a measure 
of·self•respect and reassurance; he played on the 
theme that everybody had been unfa ir to Germany. 
The Brit ish had continued the hunger blockade for 
months after the armistice , the Versailles Treaty 
was grossly unjust and a ·breach of American promises , 
the German colonies had been stolen, and Germany was 
encircled by enern ies .47 
Since the German people bel ieved in him, Hitl e r ' s  success was largely 
due to his extensive and mass ive propaganda campa ign. 
47J. A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda 
to Bra inwashing (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books , 1963) , p� 1 1 5 .  
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The People ' s  Republic of China underwent a similar process of 
propaganda , particularly durin$ the cultural revolution . This propa-
ganda was in line with Mao's thought and political indoctrina tion, 
which emphasized the virtues of good military leadership as opposed 
to the Party. During this period , military indoctrination as a major 
' 
propaganda program was injected into the mainstream of the masses . 
The military signi fied Maoist ideology and Mao Tse -tung himself,  but 
a t  the same time i t  emphasized military aspect and its important role 
in the revolution . 
No one would deny the fact that the military was the chief 
propagandist in the cultural revolution . Actually its role as a pro-
psgandist went back to earlier years, In 1960 , Marshall Lin Piao 
whose role was identified with the military, not the Party, launched 
a proletarian campaign against the un-proletarian activities of the 
. 
Party. His "four first" directive: 
. . .  provided clearcut directives in handling the 
relations between man and weapons (man comes first); 
between political work and other work (politics come 
first) ; between ideological and routine work (ideo­
logical work comes first) ; and between ideas in books 
and living ideas curre��ly in people ' s  minds (living 
ideology comes first) . 
The "four first" clearly set out the i deological prioritil'R 
o[ non-muterial incenlivcl:i as oppotw<l lo llw nwtcrinl lncontlvl\8 uf 
the Party. The so-called "Socialist Education Campaign" o f  the mili-
tary was yet another propaganda device des igned to suppress the growth 
of economism o f  the Party. These campaigns grew more and more each 
48 . Bridgham, .Q.E.• cit . ,  p .  6 .  
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year and finally merged.with the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, 
in which , undoubtedly, the military played an even s tronger role than 
' ever.  Thus , the military was able to sell much of its preferences to 
th� public through the educa tional system and the public ' s  enru lat ion 
of heroic soldiers . 
The Military and Education 
" . . •  As is well known, education in Communist China is not 
a imed primarily a t  developing the individual ,  but a t  serving the 
interest of the state .1149 Thus , the purpose of education is to 
instill the official ideology and policy. In school·, s tudents are 
taught certain concepts and values which will make students accept 
and follow them. 50 Through this type of education, s tudent� were 
trained to behave in accordance with the state policy and ideology. 
Emphasis on political education in school can be seen in 
their curricula and the time s tudents have to spend on it . .  Normally 
there are s ix periods of classes , forty�five minutes in length , plus 
I 
one period of individual s tudy o f  the "Works of Mao Tse-tung." On 
every school day, two periods are devoted to the s tudy o f  politic s .  
Therefore, including Mao ' s  works , three out of seven (over 40 %)_ of 
51  
the periods are devoted to pol itical study. Courses in 'politic_ s 
and Mao ' s  works are extremely important in a student ' s  academic 
a chievement . "A bad a t titude toward participation at  the class or 
49 George P .  Jan, "Mass Educa tion in Chinese Corranunes , "  Asian 
Survey, N o .  10 (October, 1 964) , p .  1103.  
50rbid . 
51 Gordon A .  Bennett and Ronald N .  Montaperto, Red Guard (New 
York:Doubleday, 1972) , pp . 20-21 . 
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small -group level was certain to bring trouble . 1 152 A study of Mao ' s  
writ ings is a "must" for at least ope period each day for teachers 
and s tudents al ike , even when they are on vacation or working in the 
field . Cha irman Mao ' s  little " Red Book" is to the Chinese what the 
Bible is to devout Christians . Mao himself has been deified; his 
works and words are held in reverence and followed dutifully . Mao 
has a lways emphas ized an important role in politics and greatness of 
the military as a true believer of Communism, as we shall see later 
. 
in this chapter. Therefore , it is not an overstatement to say that 
students also look upon the mil itary with admiration . H'oweve r ,  the 
military itself has penetrated into the l ives and hearts of students 
and teachers . In schools there are military courses and training. 
Bennett and Montaperto have noted: 
. . .  A l l  students and teachers received military training . 
. The PLA would send instructors to each' school . . .  and give 
basic instruction in the firing of rifles , machine guns , 
and small mortars . . .  and cond�3t bayonet drills as �ell 
as some elementary maneuvers . 
Teachers and students not only learned to appreciate the mili-
tary tra ining: they seemed to enjoy it as  well . Moreover ,  they exchange 
ideas and visits with military men, and they participate together in 
joint sports and recreation activities . Thus, students and teachers 
get �o know military men very well and have great respect for them and 
even want to emulate them. 54 
52Ibid . ,  P· 21 . 
53Ibid . ,  P· 23. 
54 
Ibid. p .  24.  
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Thus s chool , as an agent of political indoctrination, has been 
very successful in condit ioning students and teachers to regard the 
military man as a hero and leader. Their political norms and values 
have also been geared toward those of the military. T�ey are will ing 
to accept the leading role of the military in politics . 
Furthermore , the military has not l imited its propaganda to 
students and teachers in schools .  Its virtue has also made the mil i -
tary a worthy model for the people o f  China to emulate . The reasons 
for its high status appear to be its heroic deeds and virtuous charac-
ter , as will be seen in the following discussion. 
The Emulation of Military Heroes 
The military man has been a heroic fighter in the eyes of the 
Chinese Communists . He defeated the Jc:.panese aggressor in World War 
I I ,  drove bourgeois Chiang Ka i-sheki off mainland China in 1 94 9 ,  won 
the war with India in 1962 during the S ino-Indian boundary disput e ,  
and recently b rought peace to the people in the cultural 4evolution. 
The mil itary man is not only a heroic fighter ; he has also been a 
forceful and convincing force in enhancing the political behavior and 
political ideology in China . He is a true representative of the social-
. 1 d d f 1 . d . . l " 55 ist mora or er an o pro etartan iscip ine . His organization ha.s 
been regarded as a classless organiza tion which is to be emulate� by 
the nat ion a t  large . The nation must learn from the. example of the 
55Jan s .  Prybyla , 
(Scranton, Pennsylvania: 
429.  
The Political Economy of Connnunist China 
Interna tional Textbook Company , 1970) , p .  
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People ' s  L ibera tion Army and make itself a true socialist l ike the 
military. 56 
Various groups and mass organiza tions such as the All -China 
S tudents ' Federation, Peasants' Association, etc . ,  were also directed 
to learn from sections of the militar y .  They would imitate the Good 
Eight Company of the PI.A for its counter bourgeois thought,  s trengthened 
collectivism, and the like. Th� s tory of the Eight Company went as 
follows : 
. . .  The company ' s  men were honest . . . .  they returned 
1 , 390 lost articles to
.
the r ightful owners ,  including 
87 fountain pens . They were frugal , s aving 80 per cent 
of their pay .  They we+e concerned about public property , 
protecting it and fixing it up without charge .57 
I 
The people as individuals have been programmed to emulate the 
behavior of individual soldier s .  The "Learn from Lei · Feng," the "Learn 
from Wang Chieh , "  and other s imilar campaigns represented the "need" 
and the "must" for the individua'ls to value military men and behave 
l ike them. 
Hero Lei Feng came from a poor peasant family. His family had 
been deprived and exploited by the rich. His twelve year old brother 
"toiled like a beast of burden" in a fa ctory and la ter died of tuber-
culosis . His mother , a servant , was raped by the landlord. She hanged 
herself.  His fa ther was buried a l ive by Kuomintang troops . Lei Feng 
himself "was stabbed three t imes in the left hand because he had beaten 
5 6Ibid . 
57rbid . ,  p .  431 . 
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the landlor d ' s  dog . "  When the Communists took over in 1 949,  Lei Feng 
was liberated . After the liberation, he joined the PLA . To become a 
good sold ier , he studied Mao ' s  thought,  learned by hear t ,  and worked 
very hard as a soldier . Lei Feng ' s  " . . •  devotion to duty, zeal for 
hard work, uncomplaining endurance to hardship s ,  hatred of the enemy , 
love for the peopl e ,  selflessness , Red exper tise, . . .  and devotion to 
Mao Tse -tung . • .  " were to be emulated by the peopl e .  He was· killed 
while performing his duty as a soldier for the country on the Indian 
battlefront . Lei Feng was the most famous hero o f  them all. 58 
Wang Chieh was born into ' a middle class peasant family. He 
enlisted in the PI.A . He, l ike Lei Feng, also studied Mao's thought 
and worked hard to become a good soldier . Although he had never been 
oppressed (he was a ; middl e i class peasant) , Wang Chieh was very much in 
favor of the class struggle of the proletar iat ;  he had overcome his 
own incorrect class background . He was a true Communist revolutionary 
who s�crificed his life; _ he threw himself over a package of explosives 
to save many more lives of his comrades , so others could live and carry 
on the revolution. This heroic act earned him the coveted honor of 
being the true revolutionary-proletarian. The Maoist. propaganda. urged 
the people that Wang Chieh ' s  ideas and acts must be emulated. 5 9  
' . 
This emulation of the military and Mao's cultural revolution 
is the most extensive effort in history t9 transform a nation into a 
near -connnunist state by attempting to change the character of its 
SBibid . ,  pp . 431-433. 
59Peking Review, November 1 2 ,  1965,  pp . 3-4 . 
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people as well as correcting the wrongs of its system. Thus , it was 
a "moralistic and inner-directed" as well as an "outer-directed" revo-
lution. "Good men and good deeds" are what people have to be and do , 
and selfishness is the principal enemy . 60 The military as the .exemplar 
of the " good men and good deeds , "  has been chosen for the nat ion-wide 
emulation campa ign. 
I 
This campaign was expected to encourage the Chinese people to 
accept the values and leadership role of the mil itary which stands for 
true Communist values and practi,,ces and also s erves as a representative 
and advocate of the correct approaches of Maoist prior�ty of ideological 
commitment as opposed to the ma terial incentive of economism which the 
P d L . Sh h . h d b  . d · f · d · h 61  arty un er iu ao-c i a een i enti ie wit . A t  the same time 
the prestige of the Party, since its economism stood for selfishness ,  
was being undermined . 
The Chinese peopl e ,  exposed to military propaganda , have been 
indoctrinated to love , to respect , and to follow the milit�ry for years . 
Moreove.r ,  s ince the cultural revolution the military has been in con­
trol of all the propaganda machinery and the communications network ; 62 
this enables the mil itary to propagate and indoctrinate even more of 
the military ' s  virtue and the vice of the Party leadership and policy . 
60Ma ry Sheridan, "The Emulation of Heroes , "  China Quarterly, 
No .. 33 (January-Ma rch, 1968) , p .  47 . 
61 
Ibid . ,  p .  48 . 
62Edgar Snow , The Long Revolution (New York: Random House ,  
1972) , p .  116 . 
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One can appreciate and understand the depth of military propa-
ganda in China more when one compares it with the .aspirin commercia l .  
in America . I t  is weil -known that "aspirin is aspirin," and the 
government has been informing the public s o .  But, unfortuna tely, the 
drug companies have done a much better job in telling the public some-
thing else : · one ' s  aspirin is better than others ' aspirin. The one 
company that does the best job in advertising its product by letting 
it appear on television and/or radio broadcasts , etc . most often will 
be able to sell the greatest amount of aspirin. This is in a greement 
with propaganda theory: when one 'frepeats a statement often enough, 
. 
it wil l in time come to be acc�pted by his audience,1163 especially 
when one "makes bold assertions in favour" of his sta tement .64 
In America , different companies are able to voice and assert 
the quality of their products against one another and let the best 
product win. But in China , prop_aganda is done by the military alone 
with very little competit ion. Thus , the pub l ic is exposed to one view 
only, by which they are led to bel ieve that the view is good and correct . 
In the way just· stated, the mili,tary propaganda in China is more effec-
t ive than the aspirin commercials in America . 
Another example of the effectiveness of political propaganda 
follows : in Nazi Germany, where ·propaganda was not as sophisticated 
and thoroughgoing as those of the communist countries , it still proved 
to be highly successful . 65 In China , propaganda and indoctrina tion 
63 Brown , .Q.2.. c it . ,  P · 27 . 
641bid . ,  P · 28 . 
65Ibid . ,  p .  121 . 
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have been a vital part of the Corronunist ideology, policy, and Chinese 
way of life . Nazi propaganda emphas ized the negative s ide ( i . e . ,  anti-
66 semitism) more than the positive side . But Chinese propaganda has 
emphas ized both negative and positive sides , i . e . ,  anti-revisionism 
(negat ive) and the military as a representative of true Conununism 
(positive) . Therefore , it may be assumed that the Chinese propaganda 
is more e ffective than others . 
· In conclus ion it may be stated that the political propaganda 
in Communist China has been accomplished in a way that the public· is 
overwhelmingly drawn into .the process . through schools ,  massive propa-. 
ganda , and widespread emu lation of heroic soldiers . Messages and 
viewpoints of propaganda point to one direction. Only affirmative 
informations are allowe d ;  opposing viewpoints and informations are 
banned . Consequently, as directed, it has made people regard and 
accept the military as their leaders , both ideologically and politic-
ally . . This acceptance, in turn, provides legitimacy for the military 
to play a leading role in Chinese politics if it so desire s .  
66Ibid . 
CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL DOMINATION BY THE MILITARY 
Before the cultural revolution, the Chinese Co!lllnunist Party 
was a dictator of the proletariat .  Its political power and authority 
were prominent among other sta.te organs . After th� cultural revolu-
tion, its political hegemony was reduced drastically and its prestige 
' 
was badly marre d .  The �iiitary has emerged as a de facto ruler of 
China . The fal l  of the Party and the rise of the military are 
integrally related and this rela�io�ship is the subject of this 
chapter.  
· The Instabil ity of the Party 
The Chinese Co!lllnµnist Party enjoyed a stable unity until about 
the t ime of the Great Leap Forward. The disas ter of the G��at Leap pro-
vided the firm base for Party organization -men l ik€ Liu Shao-chi anq 
Peng Teh-huai to discredit Mao Tse-tung and' his authority in th� Party . 
Since that time the Party has been divided into two . camps , to so-
called " revisionists" and the "Maoists ."  The former was represented 
by the organization men of the Par ty: Liu Shao-ch i ,  Peng Teh-hua i ,  
and their followe·rs ; the latte·r group included Mao and his. followers . 
The organization men had more members and were more popular within the 
Party than the Maoists . 
35 
, 
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The rift in the Party was a disadvantage to Mao . He was losing 
authority and face; his Party chairmanship was merely symbolic . The 
Party went astray, and Mao could not rally enough followers , more parti­
cularly ranking members , to gain control over the Party. 
The organization men were professionals who cared a lot about 
how to run things (Party, industries , etc .) as effectively as  pos sibl e ,  
even when i t  meant a deviation from the Communist ideology a s  defined 
by the Maoists . The organization men were pragmatic leaders . However, 
Maoists did not take them that way, especially Mao who regarded this 
deviation as an unforgivable s in .  
Chinese Communist politics means party-pol�. tics--a party domina ­
tion in politics . Undoubtedly, Liu Shao-chi saw it that was too .  Liu 
was sure that within the Party, s ince he had firm control over the 
Party heirarchy, Mao could not harm him. Liu was absolutely right, for 
Mao was unable to get rid of Liu via Party struggle ,  because at the time 
the Party was stable, organized , ' and under Liu ' s  hand . 
As a Party man, Liu bel ieved in Party supremacy and its superior­
its over other organs of state in the republic . Since Mao was then and 
still  is chairman of the Party, he also appeared to be a vehement advo­
cate o f  Party supremacy: t�erefore , Liu was convinced that Mao would 
think the same way . Thus , Liu was confident that Mao would not bring 
the outs iders in for help .  Liu was wrong . Mao, s ince he could not 
fight within the Party, created the Red Guards and turned to the mili­
tary as  was manifested by the cultural revolution. 
37 
Mao has been a fountain of Communist ideology in· China . His 
thought has been regarded as correct, pure, and as important as 
Marxism and Leninism. Even the Party under Liu always regarded Mao ' s  
thought as  an official one to look upon and follow. Therefore ,, when 
Mao charged that the Party had been' advocating an unconununist prac-
tice--economism--and at the same time underlined the outstanding �ole 
of the military as the true ideologis t ,  the prestige of the Party as  
the leader in ideology began tq suffer greatl y .  Especially during the 
cultural revolution, when the Party was attacked and condemned fo'r its 
s in of taking the road back to capital�sm, the military was enjoying 
its glory as a true ideologist .  This created an ideological rift 
within the Party and caused it to become internally unstable . 
The Withering Away o f  Party Domination 
S inGe the beginning of the Communist revolution in China , the 
Party and the military have been in virtual competition with one another 
for the control of Chinese politics . In many ways the Party had a dom­
ineering attitude toward the military and shared some authority67that 
should exclusively belong to the military. For example , commanders of 
military regions had to share their authority68 and take advice from 
67chester Cheng, ed . ,  The Politics of the Chinese Red A rmy 
(Stanford,  Cal ifornia : Hoover Institution ou War, Revolution and 
Peace , 1966) , p .  544 . 
68Harvey Nelson, ''Milita-ry Forces in the Cultural Revolution , "  
China Quarterly, No . 51 (July-September , 1972) , p .  447 . 
the provincial Party committe e . 69 Furthermore , Party men often 
I 
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doubled as pro¥incial Party secretaries and political commissars in 
. i 1 il . d . 
0
i 7o A i . 1 . . many provLnc a m Ltary Lstr cts . prov ncia commissar is 
responsible for political affairs of the military district . A com-
missary post is very important since it is in charge of all political 
propaganda and indoctrination as well as supervising the ideologicaL 
7 1  training of the troops . 
The presence of Party men as political commissars· demons trated 
the existence of Party domination in the military establishment . But 
this did not mean that the military had not tried to pull above or a t  
least to the same level a s  the Party. The military was . quite . success -
ful because there were many military commanders who also were political 
commissars of their units after 1954 . 7 2  
The increas ing power of the military and leadership of Lin 
Piao a fter he had replaced Peng Teh-hua i as Defense Minister in 1958 , 
a larmed the Party leadership which in turn reasserted · control over the 
military by appointing more Party men to the post of political · CO!llffiis-
7 3  sars . This clearly suggests that there has been a series. of political -
69 A .  Doak Barnett , Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Polit ical Power in 
Communist China (New York: Columbia University Pres s ,  1967) , p .  245. 
70Donald W .  Klein, "The 'Next Generation' of Chinese Communist 
Leaders , "  China Quarterly, No. 12 (October-December ,  1962) , p .  60 . 
7 1Dereck J .  Waller, The Government and Politics of Communist 
China (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971) , p .  110 . 
7 2John Gittings , "Army-Party Relat ions in the Light of the 
Cultural Revolution," in Party Leadership and Revolutionary Power in 
China , e d .  by John Wilson Lewis (London: Cambridge University Pres s ,  
1970) , p .  389 . 
73Ibid . 
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assertion campaigns for hegemony between the military and the Pa'rty .. 
However ,  whenever it felt it nec�ssary, the Party was able to con-
trol the military. It was not until the t ime if the cultural revo -
lution that the military was able to exert its influence over the 
Party and to be really independent of the Party. During the cultural 
revolution the great majority of political commissars who were Party 
74 men were unseated by military men .  
The f ight for commissary posts between the military and the 
Party was not only because the corranissarship is an important pos.i�ion 
politically, but also because this was a symbolic fight involving poli-
tical principle . To the military, it was · the struggle to gain its 
• I 1 
rightful prerogative . To the Party, it wa� the struggle to maintain 
the supremacy -of the Party over other state organs , including the 
military establ ishment .  Therefore , when the Party los t the �ight for 
commissarship, it meant that the domina tion of the Party over the mili-
tary was withering away.  
The Fall of the Party 
During the cultural revolution , the Party as a whole was pub-
l icly degraded . Its leadership came under heavy fire by the Maoists . 
L iu Shao-chi, who was the head of state until he was ousted in 1968 , 
was denounced by the Red Guards for being a rev·is ionis t .  The Party 
' 
as an institution was also labelled as a fountain of revisionism, s ince 
Liu and his colleagues who were running the Party always identified 
themselves with the Party and the Party with them. On the contrary, 
74rbid . 
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Mao himself, who was and still is cha irman of the Party, did not 
identify with the Party. At the time , Mao virtually had no control 
over the Party and its organization; figuratively speaking, he was a 
dead parent �ho had been left out of the Party. It could also be 
observed that Mao was above the Party and politics . 
Ironically, Mao as  the Party Chairman, who should have been 
1 
responsible for the Party ' s  wrong doing (economism) , was· able to rid 
himself of the burden because of his failure --he could not control the 
Party and its organization men . . Moreover, it was not only that he did 
not have to be responsible for the wrong doing of the Party; rather 
Mao ,  as Party head,  wanted to destroy the Party which in a high degree 
was his own creation and once a foundation of his own power and status . 7 5  
Up until just before the cultural revolution in mid-1 966 , the 
Chinese Communist Party was the most powerful organization in the 
country . Professor Barnett writes : 
. . .  A l l  government organizations in Corranunist China . 
. . .  function under very close Party direct ion . . .  The 
. Party acts as the primary policy-making body, while 
government units . . .  are ' respons ible for implementing 
Party-defined policies � 7 6  
But in the cultural revolution, many high ranking Party offi-
cials were purged as a result -of the attacks of the Red Guards . The 
Party ' s  highest adminis trative ' body , the Central Committee Secretaria t ,  
7 5
Benjamin I .  Schwartz , "The Reign of Virtue: Some Broad 
Perspectives• on ".L�ader. and Party in the Cultural Revolution," China 
Quarte rly, No . 35 (July-September ,  1968) , p . · 1 .  
7 6  Barnett, 2£.· cit . ,  p .  18 . 
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was virtually destroyed , s ince its Secretary-General Teng Hsiao-ping 
and his staff on the comrnittee 1were purged . 7 7  It was not a Peking 
phenomenon that the Party ' s  organizations were brought down ; the 
regional and prov inc ial Party officials were also purged and the 
organizat ions were dys func tional throughout the country . 78 
As a result of the cultural revolution, the structure of the 
Communist Party was shattered by attacks from non-Party organizations 
--Red Guards , revolutionary rebels , and the military. The downfall 
of the Party meant that the revisionists and anti-Maoists in the Party 
were suppressed and put under control . The Party ' s  functions were 
paralyzed . Its power and authority were taken away. Last but not 
leas t ,  its prestige , leadership, and superiority over other organs of 
state were also gone . While the prestige of the Party was collapsing, 
the prestige of the military man as a true communist and leader of the 
7 9  revolution ros e ,  and the authority of the military became unquestion-
80 
able . 
There can be l ittle doubt that the Chinese Communist Party has 
lost its integrity and that its structure has been shattered. The 
Party losses , realistically, would be worse if  one ex�mined the poli-
tical gain of the military, which emerged as the real winner at the 
great expense of the Party. 
77Parris H .  Chang, "Mao ' s  Great Purge: A Political Balance 
Sheet , "  P roblems of Communism, Vol . XVIII (March-April , 1969) , p �  6 .  
78Ibid . ,  p .  7 .  
7 9  
Bennett and Montaperto, .Q.E.· cit . ,  p .  1 6 3 .  
80Ibid . ,  p .  165 .  
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The Military as a Party-Builder 
Later on the shattered Party was to be reorganized in the 
Maoist mold . This reorganization was accomplished by yet other non-
Party organizations called "Revolutionary Corranittees . "  These com-
mittees were establ ished on the "three-in-one combination" principl e .  
The three were a s  follows : (1) revolutiona:ry "Party and government" 
cadres , (2) revolutionary masses--young people ,  fprmer Red Guards - etc . ,  
d ( 3) h · 1 · 81 an t e mi itary. 
Of the three , the military was the only organized group and 
was respected by the other two , who were disorganized . Professor 
Prybyla describes the relat ionship of these two gvoup s :  
. . .  (they) were only factions ready a t  the drop of a 
hat to fly a t  each other ' s  throats , compete with each 
other for the distinction of being the most revolution-' . 
ary, and
.
accuse each other of revolutionary deficiencies .�2 
Thus , one should not be surprised at all that ,  in fact) t�e 
military alone dominated the revolutionary conunittees that had set up 
a t  all levels of China ' s  provinc�s . That the military was overrepre-. I I 
t d . th " tt 83  . 1 h 1 k t th • t •  sen e in e corrani ees is c ear w en one oo s a e compos i.. ion 
of these c0mmittees . Of all 29 · chairmen of these committees ,. 20 (70%) 
84 of them were active military men . 
81 
. Prybyla , .Q.E.· cit . ,  p .  529 . 
82Ibid . 
83wang Yun , "Maoist . ,
·
Revolutionary Conunittees ' :  Organization 
and P rospects , "  Issues and Studies (December, 1968) , p .  3 .  
84 
Richard M .  Pfeffer, "Serving the People and Continuing the 
Revolution ,"  China Quarterly, No.  52 . (0ctober-December, 1972) , p .  650 . 
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The duty of the revolutionary committees was to rebuild the 
Party. Thus the domination of1 the military in these corrantttees pro-
vided the military with the most powerful authority in administering 
85 Party rectification and rebuilding it . As  a Party-builder, the mili-
tary also had control over Party organization and .structure . Before. 
the cultural revolutipn, the Party was running the country; but now 
the count"ry was like a broken skeleton awa.iting the military to 
redesign and rebuild it . 
Military Personnel in the Party Organization 
In April 1968,  1 , 512 delegates of the National Co�gress of 
the Chinese Conununist Party elected the Ninth Central Committee of 
86 the Party. This Central Committee, cons isting of 170 regular 
. 
87 members and 109 alternates , i$ the " . . .  highest leading body of the 
. . 88 Partf' when the Nat ional Party Congress is not in session. The 
Congress will only be convened once every five years or longer if it 
is necessary. 89 Therefore , practically, the Central Committee, com-
pared to the National Party Congress , is where the power resides . It 
is then proper to say that the more the numbers of a group membership 
are represented in the Central Corranittee, the greater the domination 
that particular group has over che Central Committee. 
85 Ralph L .  Powe l l ,  "The Party, the Government and the Gun , "  
Asian Survey, N o .  6 (June 1970) , p .  444 . 
86Peking Review , April 14, 1969,  p p .  7 - 9 .  
87p k . R · A · 1  30 1969 45 48 e ing eview, pri , , p p .  - . 
88chinese Communist Party, 1969 Cons titution, A rt .  VI • 
. 89Ibid . ,  Art . VIII . 
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In the present Central Conunittee , the military is the largest 
90 
group (about 50%) within the, total membership of this group . This 
is four times larger than it used to be . 91 The great number of the · 
military personnel on the Central Committee indicates tha t the �il i-· 
tary is in control of the Central Committee.  
Furthermore , the political s trength of the military can be 
seen even more clearly when one looks at  'the Political Bµreau (Pol itburo) 
o f  the Ninth Central Committee . This Politburo is a higher organ than 
the Central Committee (see heirarchical chart of the Chinese Communist 
Party at the end of this chapter) . Out of twenty-one voting members 
of the Pol itburo , eleven are military men: before ranks were aboiished 
92 in China , three were marshalls and e ight were generals . There .have 
never been as many military men in the Central Committee or Politburo 
before . The large numbers of military men indicate that the military . !' I 
had control over the Party because it was �ble to put military men into 
such powerful Party-organs . 
In the light of the discussion in this chapter, it is evident 
that the Party has lost its power and authoeity to the military. The 
losses of the Party were not 1 imited to Pa.rty members in the Party 
organization alone . Party members who were in other state organs were 
also purged .  For example , a s tudy of the State Council , which is an 
90chang Ching-wen, "Analysis of the Newly Elected Ninth Central 
Conunittee , "  Issues and Studies Puly, 1969) , pp . 33-34 . 
91Donald W. Klein and Lois B .  Hage r ,  "The Ninth Central Committee ,"  
China Quarterly, No.  45 (January-Ma rch , 1 971) , p .  5 2 .  
92Powel l ,  .Q.2. •  cit . ,  p .  46 2 .  
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administrative organ of the state, shows that many Party members who 
were holding the posts of ministers and vice ministers were also purged, 
while the non-Party ministers a�d vice ministers were almost untouched . 93 
This shows that the military who did the purging was concentra ting its 
efforts on des troying the Party, both its organization and its members . 
The reason for this effort of the military was the ".fact ' tha t the mil i -
tary viewed the Party a s  the chief holder of political power; therefore, 
in· ord.er to take away the Party ' s  political power and authority the 
Party must be destroyed.  As the literature indicates , the Party was 
destroyed. 
93 
Donald W. Klein, "The State of Council and the Cultural 
Revolution," China Quarterly, No . 35 (July-September, 1968) , p .  87 . 
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a CONT ROLS 
CHAPTER VI 
INEVITABLE CLASH OF CLASSES 
There has been a firm belief in Conununist China , especially 
among the Mao ists , that . there is a constant struggle of classes . 
The Maoists ' orientation toward the nature of classes is ideological 
as well as political . To them, the' struggle of classes must be con-
trolled in such a way that Conununist ideology will be the sole beacon 
of the proletaria� and for the proleta ria t .  To make this possible, 
military domination seems to be the only logical and practical solu-
tion ·to the problem of class struggle ,  as the following discuss ion 
will reveal . 
The Continuity of Class Struggle in the Society 
The supei:structure, which includes idea s , " religion, arts , law, 
and political power, has been created for the purpose of maintaining 
and preserving the commanding class in society. Of these components 
of the superstructure , political- power is the most important, for it 
exists at the very center of the superstructure . 94 In China , politi-
95 cal power is regarded as the power to suppress .  Power tq suppress 
94Lin Piao, "Informal Address at the Pol itburo Meeting, "  in 
Lin Piao,  Martin Ebon (New York: Stein and Day, 1970) , p .  253·. 
95Ibid. 
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means both its existence and usability, that is , this power' must be 
real and strong enough to suppress any opponent force . This political 
power is also used as an oppressive instrument by which one class· with 
96 
the power chooses to oppress the other without the powe r .  
In a capitalistic society, political power is in the hands of  
I 
the capitalist clas s ,  which in turn uses it to oppress and exploit the 
pr�letarian class . Therefore , if the proletarians do not wish to be 
oppressed and exp�oited, they must obtain that political power by any 
means necessary. In China , the proletariat is no longer oppressed and 
exploited by the capitalis t ,  since they have overthrown the explo�ting 
97 
class and took away political power from that class by fore� of arms . 
As  long as the proletarians have this power, they will not have to 
suffer from the capitalist exploitation again . 
But class antagonism still persists in Chine·se society. Although 
the exploiting classes have been overthrown and political power has been 
taken away from them, they have no� been exterminated. Their 'properties 
were confiscated but not their reactionary thought, s ince the revolu-
98 
tionary proletarians could only imprison them but not their thought.  
According to the Conununist line, these capitalists will be�ome reaction-
aries who will try to restore capitalis� and struggle for their " lost 
99 
paradise . "  Therefore the struggle between the proletariat and the 
96Ibid . 
97Lin Piao , "Betrayal of  the October Revolution," 'in Ebon , .Q.E.· 
c it . ,  p .  229 . 
98i�n Pia o ;  "Infonnal Address at  the Pol itburo Meet ing , "  .Q.E.· 
£i!. , p .  261 . 
99Ibid . 
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bourgeoisie is by no means over after the proletariat has seized poli-
tical power .  As Mao indicates ; the+e will be a class struggle between 
the proletariat and bourgeoisi� until there is a classless society ,
lOO 
which may take a long time to come, if ever . Thus the class struggle 
is permanent . 
In Communist China the proletarian class already has political 
power ;  therefore , instead of trying to seize political power, the revo-
lutionary (toward Communism) force of the proletariat must suppress 
the counter-revolutionary force 'of the bourgeoisie from taking pol iti-
cal power from them. As in the cultural revolution , the· revolutionary 
force led by the military was very successful in suppressing the counter-
revolutionary revisionists led by Liu Shao-ch i .  
The Power o f  the Gun 
The continuity of class struggle indicates the need to possess 
and maintain political power by the proletariat to insure victory in 
I 
the struggle .  Therefore, the proletariat needs political power to 
suppress the revis ionis ts ; and' to have political power, the proletariat 
must know the source of political power .  To them, as Mao points out, 
" . . .  political power grows out of the barrel of a gun .11101 This much 
quoted statment of Mao suggests that political power is obtainable 
only by raw force; it belongs to the. strongest . This means that the 
military, which has the gun, will be the strongest political element 
lOOLin Piao,  " Sweep Away All Ghosts and Monsters ,"  in Ebon , 
22.· c it . ,  p .  229.  
101 ' �ao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy , "  Selected Works , 
II (Peking: Foreign Languages Press , 1965) , p .  224. 
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in a country . Therefore , · the military will control political power 
in a society. 
Furthermore, Chinese Communlsts not only bel ieve that " . . .  poli-
tic.al power grows out of the barrel of the gun ,"  they also bel ieve tha t ,  
a s  Mao says: " . . .  All things grow out o f  the barrel o f  the gun . 11102 
Therefore, with the gun they can obtain and create everything, i . e . ,  
schools , organizations , culture, and the proletarian country- - in the 
past the military with its gun barrels ove�threw the bourgeoisie 
government of Chiang Kai-shek, and establ ished the proletarian govern-
ment. 
Based on this discussion of the Chinese concept of the "perm-
anent nature of class s truggle ,"  it is obvious that the proletariat 
definitely needs and must rely upon the m'il itary for its su�vi.val as 
the dominant class in the permanent class struggl e .  It is a fact that 
other state organs , i . e . , the Party does not have nor can it provide a 
real "political power,"  a lthough it may exercise political. power pro-
. . 
vided for and permitted by the milita ry.. Thus , political power belongs ' 
to and is always available to the military. 
The Guardian of the Proletariat 
The military has been a powerful instrument for political 
struggle in· China . It fought and won the wars against bobh external 
(Japan) and internal (Chinag Kai-shek) enemies . It restored order and 
l02Ibid . 
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brought peace to the Chinese people . It provides security for the 
people . The military was also an economic force, at least for its 
103 men , which produced plenty of food and clothing. Most of all , 
the mil itary controls political power due to its possess ion of the 
raw power of the state . In fact, the Chinese people owe mµch of 
what they have to the military; as  Mao has ·pointed out , without the 
· 1 · h 1 ld h h 0 104 mi itary, t e peop e wou ave ?Ot ing. 
As the guardian of the . proleta ria t ,  the military always sides 
' 
with the proletariat and " • . .  fights not for private interests of a 
few individuals or a narrow clique, but for the interests of the 
broad masses and the whole nati.on. 11105 The recent role of the mili ·-
tary in the cultural revolution has shown that actually it has per- . 
formed the role and assumed the respons ibility just described . It 
also shows that to have a socialist state o f  the proletaria t ,  China 
needs the military. Its existence and contributions , acco.rding to the 
Marxist point of view , have made the military the " . . .  chief component 
of the state power . • . 11;06 without the military the state would have 
no power .  
The military is not only a controller o f  the gun barre l ,  it 
ha.s also establ ished itself as a true bel iever of Communism as repre-
sented by Mao Tse -tung Thought (a written form of Maoism which implies 
103 ' 
Mao Tse-tung, "We Must Learn to Do Economic Work , "  Selected 
Works > III (Peking: Foreign Languages Pres s ,  1965) , p .  243 . 
104Mao Tse -tung, Quotation from Cha irman Mao Tse-tung (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Pres s ,  1966) , p .  9 9 .  
lOSibid . 
106 Mao Tse-tung , "Problems of War and Stra tegy ," .Q.E.· cit . ,  
p .  224 . 
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the equal ity of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse -tung Thought) . 107 It is 
1 
obvious that the two most important factors (correct ideology and 
political power) of a Communist nation are vested on the military. 
It is then very appropriate to state that the military is indeed 
" . . .  the mighty pillar of the dictatorship o f  the proletariat . . .  , "  
not the Party. 108 Moreover ,  the increasing importance of the mili- . 
tary in this l ight has no l imit in Chinese politics . When the 
mil itary speaks , its voice will be heard and hcc<lc<l too i'n ChlncHc 
politics . 
For its qual ity, the military is indispensabl e ,  especially 
as opposed to the Party, which in the cultural revolution has been 
proved very dispensable and has been placed under military control . 
Also the ''.cultural revolution" manifested }1ao'  s famous statemen t ;  
" . . • The Party commands the gun, and the gun must never b e  a llowed 
to command the Party11109 was also null and void . The reason for 
' 
Mao ' s  saying was that he projected the Party as the Party which is 
armed �ith correct ideology in comparison with the military the gun 
as jus t a gun without correct ideology. Even s o ,  the Party· is a sub­
ordinate of the "author of correct ideology,11110 in this cas e ,  Mao, 
s ince he is considered to be above the Party and politics . Mao is 
l07M .  Rej a i ,  Mao Tse-tung on Revolut ion and War (New York: 
Doubleday & Company, 1970) , p .  426 . 
p .  328 . 
p .  224 • 
108Lin Piao , "Revolutionary Vigilance ," in Ebon, .Q.E.• cit . ,  
109Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of War and Strategy," 2£.· cit . ,  
. 110 Stuart R. S chram, "The Party in Chinese Communist Ideology," 
China Quarterly, No . 38 (April'-June, 1969) , p .  3 .  
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very serious about the supremacy of the author of correct ideology; 
he himself openly admitted that he was a subordinate of Stalin who 
was then the chief proponent of Communism (Marx, Enge l s ,  and Lenin 
were a l ready dead) , 1l�  as Mao is now . 
It is the 11correct ideology" that commands the gun ; it is not 
the Pa rty or the military that are a llowed to take command . S ince the 
military now is equipped with the correct ideology of Mao Tse -tung, 
there should not be anything to deter the military from taking politi-
cal command. If there is anything to prevent the military from taking 
over power in China , it certainly is not Mao ' s  motto, " . . .  the gun must 
never be a llowed to command the Party," especially when the Party is 
' 
ideologically wrong . The cultural revolution was a very good example,  
by which the gun, in fac t ,  did command the Party. 
111stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought o f  Mao Tse -tung 
(rev. ed . ;  Harmondsworth: Penguin Books , 1969) , pp . 425 -28 . 
CHAPTER VII 
THE PROTECTOR OF COMMUNISM 
' 
In Cliapter VI , the ideological aspect of the readiness of 
the military to be a guardian of the proletariat was discussed. 
This chapter wil 1 . discuss the "expert" who is regarded as a vicious 
factor most likely to endanger the purity of Communism. Therefore , 
the ltexpert" has to be suppressed and kept away from damaging the . 
ideology and the country of the proletaria t .  In order to preserve 
the purity of the ideology and save the country for the proletariat 
the military will have to be the protector of Communism and Cornniunist 
China . 
Experts are those individua ls who are college graduate s ,  or 
h . 1 1 1 2  t e equi.va ent . These people are proud o f  themselves . and their 
expertise . They would seek a technocratic approach to problems and 
planning in opposition to the "reds" who are inclined toward ideo-
logical purity and stress the anti-intellectual approach to problems 
. 113  and planni.ngs . For example ,  Chinese· economic experts , as Dr . 
Goldman observes , would want: 
112Barne t t ,  • t  46 ££• il_• ) p • I • 
113 
• l I 
Pye , 2.£· .£!!. ,  p .  278 . 
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. . .  a . pragmatic, rather than an ideological ,  approach 
to economic problems . . . .  efficiency, instead of pol i ­
tical expediency, be made the basis of investments and 
that the market-place, irizead of administrative deci­
s ions , determine prices . 
l 
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This intellectual tendency has existed and persisted in Chinese 
Communist society for some time . Mao ' s  "Hundred Flowers and the ·Hun-
dred School of Thought" campaign. in 1957 indicated that there was a 
t ime when the regime would need intellectual advice an4 criticism from 
the professionals in the fields . The campaign al lowed experts to voice 
their disagreement with the policy or practice of the regime . They 
accused the regime of deterring the progress of the country b� paying 
too much attention to ideological factors and little attention to scien-
tific factors concerning the technical know-how . Indeed, some of them 
even suggested the (democratic) multi-party system as opposed to the 
moncratic political system of Communist China . 115 ·They cla imed that 
China belongs to every Chinese including the counter-revolutionaries 
d h b . . 
116  an t e ourgeoisie. �inalli, Mao had to put a s top to the campa ign, 
s ince the criticism by the experts was too damaging to the Communist 
ideology. These flowers were �llowed to bloom for only six weeks . 117  
114 Merle Goldman, "Party Policies Toward the Intellectuals , " 
in (ed .) Lewis , 2£· cit . ,  p .  278 . 
ll5  Prybyla , .2.12. · cit . ,  p .  246 . 
11() . 
Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campa ign and . the 
Chinese Intellectuals (New York: Praeger, 1960) , p .  5 7 .  
117 Prybyla ,  £2.· ill· , p .  242. 
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Then the regime resumed its strict control over the intellectua l s ,  
and criticized them o f  being ·"i;ion-red" ; this campaign was Mao ' s  idea . 
The t ime of the campaign ( 1 957) �as before the Great Leap Forward 
(1958) when Mao occupied a dominant position in the Party. This 
suggests that at that t ime the Party was "red . "  But after the Great 
' 
Leap Forward started, with Peng Teh-hua i ' s  attack on Mao and his 
policy, the Party became an advocate of intellectual app'roach in 
problems and plannings . Goldman points out that in 1961 the Party 
under the leadership of Liu Shao-chi: 
. . . sought to enhance the prestige of the intellectuals 
at the expense of the cadres . It reversed its previous 
policy of downgrading intellectual achievement and 
stressed the crucial role of the intellectuals and the 
professionals in the development of China . The cadres 
a�d masses were told that ideological orthodoxy , admini­
strative abilities and labour could not alone build a 
modernized society; the techniques and professional 
skills of the intellectuals must also be used. In 
contrast to the proceeding period of repression, the 
leadership decreed tha0t intellectual endeavor and 
professional proficiency, rather than ideological118 orthodoxy , should be the standard of achievement . 
It  is obvious that the Party was de �emphasizing ideology and 
was encouraging experts to use the scientific approach in regard to 
both problems and planning . The Party then was in agreement with the 
"expert , "  who hoc.I rcga rded the modcrniza t ion of the coun t.ry ond C' <: O  -
nomic development as the highest priority of them a l l ,  even if it 
meant taking the road back to capital ism and a confronta t ion between 
capital ism and social ism in the Chinese society. While the Party was 
118 
Goldman, 2£· cit . ,  pp . 270-7 1 .  
5 9  
making use of the experts regardless of their non-conununist methods 
(end justifies the means) to "develop the oountry, the military was 
campaigning for the absolute domination of ideology . 1 1 9  I t  is also 
in this l ight that one can identify the military with the "red" labe l ,  
and the Party with the label o f  revisionism. With the "experts" having 
their ways of solving problems or planning in their jobs , ·comes the 
threat to the political domination of the ''re�' s ince the decis ion of 
the "experts" will be based on professionalism and expertise as opposed 
to the ideology of the "red ."  
The alleged revisionism of the Party in the cultural revolution 
was in fact a continuation of expertise instead of "redness" of the 
Party s ince 1 961 . The failure o f  the Hundred Flowers Campa�gn and the 
purges of the cultural revolution had proved that the "red" would not 
tolerate the "experts" and their profess iona l ism. At the same time ,  
it was clear that the "experts" would consistently try to mobilize 
themselves to gain access to the inner core of political power which 
was no,w in the hands of the anti-intellectual class ("red") for the 
"experts" bel ieved that power politics rightfully belonged to the 
d . d 1 120 most e ucate c ass . The belief that the educated class should be 
the rightful ruler has had a strong ruot also in other As·ian countries . 1 21 
'l'hus thia would oppcar to be a regional belief.  
119 See Chapter IV above . 
120p ye , .Q.E.· £.ll.. ,  p .  1 99 .  
121
Abdul Lateef, a suggestion to this author (June , 1973) . 
I 
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Undoubtedly, the "experts" are capable enough to govert;l China . 
This capability plus the ambition o f  the "experts" constitutes a 
threat to the "reds" who are now in power .  Therefore , the "reds'' will 
try every way possible to keep the "experts" from becoming a power 
holder. 
As in the cultural revolution, institutions of higher learning 
were deprived of their right to be operated academically and profession-
ally.  For examp l e ,  the use o f  examinations and objective measurement 
of academic capabilities was e l iminated in favor of the new system of 
ideological commitment and political feelings of candidates for admis-
122 
s ion . In important fields such as  economics , economic experts who 
were in control of the Chinese economy before the cultural revolut ion , 
were .replaced by far more inferior men from peasant and worker back-
ground and by military men . The inferior students and men �ere strongly · 
conunitted to the Maoist ideology. The "reds" bel ieve that their (th� 
inferiors ' )  ideological commitMent will not · change . It is acceP,table 
that the new experts will conform more to the ide·a of the "reds ,"  but 
there is no reason to assume that the new experts , at  least in the 
long run when the fashionable revo�utiona.ry-fervor is gone , will ' carry 
123 out their responsibilities any differently from the previous experts . 
Furthermore , the new experts , after they have mastered their trades and 
technical know-how of their new jobs and profess ions , will become just 
122p . 47 ye • .Q.I?... £.!!.. ' P • ; 
123Richard Dia o ,  "The Impact of the Cultural Revolution on 
China ' s  Economic Elite," China Quarterly, No . 42 (April -June , .1970) , 
p .  86 . 
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the "experts ,"  which will make them or condition them toward profes-
sional ism and expertise rather than ideology. As Professor Schurmann 
points out, these professional intellectuals are strongly ·committed 
to their professionalism, expert ise , and technical knowledge . He says 
that in China , these experts : 
. . • are admiring of advanced countries, Russia as well 
as the United States . They are finnly convinced that 
only expertise4 not political direction will modernize the country . 12 
China is a developing country, and, naturally, communist leader-
ship wants to see her developed . But development , s ince it involves 
rational planning and an intellectual approach to problems and· needs 
requires experts and their spe�ialization. 
It  is a good thing for a country to be indus trialized and 
modernized . But a t  the same time it is bad for Communist ideology, 
particularly l;iaoism, because its s trict and s trong commitment to the 
purity of ideology will be destroyed by the commitment to specializa-
tion of experts . That is, these experts will look at  things profession-
a l ly not ideologically (i . e . ,  using economic and ma terial incentives 
rather than coercion or ideological fanaticism in asking men to work 
or perform their duty) . By this inclination these experts will fonn 
a new class and have new value s .  David Truman states that the need 
for specialization is:  
124Franz S churmann, "China ' s  Economic Policy: Transition or 
Beginning , "  in (ed .) Choh-ming L i ,  Industrial Development in Communist 
China (New York: Praeger, 1964) , p .  85 . 
1 
. . .  to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 
phys ical environment ,  and they special izations are 
allocated . to individuals roughly on the basis of 
differences in skills . Men are preoccupied by their 
skill s ,  and these preoccupations in large measure 
define what the members of such groups know and 
perceive about the world in which they l ive . . .  (and 
groups will be formed) among those who shf �S this . 
' knowledge ' and the attitudes it fosters . 
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Therefore , the intere� t of the "experts" will be in conflict 
with those of the "reds" because of differences in their values , atti-
tude s ,  and the choice of means to develop the country. 
Thus , to a high degree,  .�he " experts" class is tak:fog the road 
"forward" toward capitalism (the author uses the term f.o rward , rather 
than the normally used "backward" because its emphas is is on profes-
s ionalism and progress rather than just going back to the bourgeoisie 
system of old China) . Furthermore, they like to be rewarded for the 
job they do . S ince they are the ones who contribute more to the 
development of China , they should be rewarded in terms of material 
incentives more than men who lack knowledge . This privilege will 
have to· be increased for them even more in the fut�re when the need 
for. experts in developing the country increase s .  As Schram indic.ates : 
. .  ·. the process of industrialization and modernization 
under way in China leads to the emergence of the same 
tendencies which have been engendered by economic 
development in other c�untries: increasing functional 
differentiation and the bir1th o f  a new form o f  social 
stratification, the subordination of (Conununist) values 
to tr�Bnical rational ity, the primacy of economic incent­
ive . 
125 
David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Al fred 
A .  Knopf,  1 958) ; p .  54 . 
126 
Schram, "Party in Chinese Conununist Ideology ,"  .2.E.· c it . ,  
p .  26.  
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The domination and privilege of a bureau.cratic and technocra tit elite 
' 127 . in the Soviet Union represents ; a  'manifestation of this vi�w . 
But at the same time , the "reds" will not tolerate this econo-
mism a s  we have seen in the cultural revolution . As long as the con-
viction that " redness" is better and more importa�t than "expertise" . 
still prevails in the. eyes of the Chinese Communist leadership, and 
particularly the military l eadership who are in power now, the " experts" 
will be put int� the provided frame and play the ass igned role which 
is not a ruling .. role . At the same time the "experts" because of their 
conviction that they are the best educated class , and are therefore 
better fit to play a ruling role than any of the other cla.sses ; hence 
they w i l l  always try to break out of that "provided frame" and cl imb 
over any political barrier to become the ruler, or one of the rulers . 
But the "reds" who bel ;i.eve in ideological purity will not let 
them do so , and the military which is the leader of the "reds" will 
use force if necessary to protect and preserve the domination of the 
proletarian class . In the cultural revolution the military did help 
the other reds ( i . e . ,  Red Guard&) attacking the Party because it 
wanted ideology over profess ionalism--" redness" over !'expertise . "  As 
long as  the military wants the supremacy of ideology , since it con-
trols the political power of the gun , the military will a�ways have 
it . 
Therefore , as long as there exists a contradiction (by their 
very nature there will always be) between "expertise" and " redness" 
127Ibid . 
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in Communist . China , the "experts" will try to gain power and the "reds" 
will try to suppress the "experts':" The military which is also red 
will a lways suppress the " experts ,"  and thus will continue to dominate 
the Chinese political arena . 
CONCLUSION 
As an organization, the Chinese Communist Party which used 
to be the most influential organ of state suffered a great setback 
during the cultural revolution. Politically, it has los t its author­
ity and power to the military. Thi� makes it most unlikely for the 
Party �o recuperate and make a· comeback as a leader in political 
leadership again, especially when it nas been controlled and rebuilt 
by its rival , the military. 
By its own merit, the military is quite popular with the 
publ ic , and also its propaganda and indoctrination seems to have 
convinced the Chinese �eople that the military is better and more 
truthful to Communism than the Party. Thus , the military leader­
ship belongs to and stands for the betterment of the proletariat . 
One must also bear in mind that the place o f  the military in China , 
as  in most of the developing countries , is completely different from 
the one preva iling in the western countries or, for that matter, in 
the Soviet Union . In the West and in the Soviet Union, the mil'itary 
has a lways known where their place i s .  But in China things are 
different . The public has been con?itioned to view the military i s 
political role as an essential part o f  the Chinese political system. 
The military itself has always tried to make itself at least one of 
65 
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the rulers if not the only ruler. But, in the West, it would be 
extremely hard, if  not impossible, for the military to do s o ,  
because o f  constitutional tradition and regard for representative 
institutions . 
The clear indication that the military wished to take over 
power in Communist China can be seen in the case o f  Lin Piao,  who 
was a potential successor of Mao Tse -tung before Lin ' s  death in an 
airplane crash . Lin attempted to take over the power from Mao . 
This shows that in fact the milttary did want the power .  The reason 
for this might be s imply that the military wanted the power or that 
the military regarded itself as a better vanguard than the Party since 
' 
the Party was guilty of revisionism in the pas t ,  when at the same time 
the military has been a true representative o f  Communism. 
The failure of Lin Piao ' s  coup d ' etat against Mao was because 
he picked the wrong time and, most of a l l , the wrong person. His mis-
take was that he was challenging Mao at the time that Mao ' s  status was 
ve·ry high. This · loss of Lin ' s  was a personal loss in a personal fight 
with Ma.o ; it was not a loss of the military and a gain of the Party. 
The milita ry will try this again especially since its leadership has 
tasted glory during the cultural revolution. In the future there may 
be no Mao, but the thirst for 0power of the military will always be 
there . 
It is also true that there will be a continuat ion of a struggle 
between the "experts" and the "reds . "  The "experts" means the rise o f  
67 
non-communist (economism) practice and ideology. This development 
will make it necessary for the military, which regards itself as 
the strong "reds" to play the role of the protector of  communism by 
putting down the "experts ." It is most probable that the mil i.tary, 
which is replacing the Party, will eventually rule Communist China 
in the name of  Communism. 
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